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Our recent paper in this journal (1) was followed, in the same issue, by a response by Lamb (2) and by a further discussion by Whitaker in the preceding paper of this issue. We would wish to emphasise the following points concerning the basis of our analyses. 1 bility. Equally we did not claim that our method was in any sense optimal, just that it would be preferable to what happens now. 4. Whitaker and Lamb have both misunderstood the assumed context of the decision-making process we described. We are dealing with an insurance-based system for the provision of health care. In asking the respondents to the survey to 'choose' we felt that we were trying to access the individuals' different levels of priorities for the allocation ofbenefits. The structure of the conceptual model was felt to be the same as when deciding which particular benefits would be of value when selecting say motor insurance against a fixed budget. If one knows with certainty that one's windscreen is never going to be shattered then one might not deem that benefit worthwhile. Equally ifone had just had one's windscreen shattered the desirability of that benefit would be dramatically changed. We were asking respondents, with little if any knowledge of the future, to select population benefits which would accrue from the population health insurance: that is, what relative responsibilities they feel they have for different future population groups. Note that some of these parameters are unvarying, for example sex, and some may vary, for example age. Whitaker and Lamb both confuse the notion of population responsibility with the special responsibilities that individuals feel for their families and close friends. We were asking what collective relative responsibilities society should have for, say, the young and the elderly. There is no reason why we should want or expect society to have the same responsibility as ourselves for the young and the elderly amongst our own family and friends and vice versa.
We try to decide what benefits should accrue from our insurance-based health service and ensure that these benefits are delivered. Ifwe are unhappy with the general levels of benefits then we are free to change the level of premiums. Alternatively, if we find that the benefits accruing specifically to our families or friends are not sufficient for us as individuals to feel that we have suitably discharged our responsibilities to them then we may be able to divert our personal resources to help discharge this responsibility. Note that we would have an expected level of benefit for each member of society, a circumstance which is sadly lacking at the moment as the level of benefit can usually only be found during the clinical consultation. In The utilitarian principle which underpins our notion of population responsibility is merely a method of obtaining a consensus. In our everyday lives we all probably subscribe to some personal hybrid philosophy, some of whose components were alluded to by Whitaker. Individuals and groups within society find the motivation to complement or supplement what they see as the existing (unwritten) prejudices of the consensus. One only has to study the contribution made by say the Cystic Fibrosis Trust in supplementing the insurance-based benefits accruing to people carrying this genetic disorder to realise that the consensus basis for providing population benefits does not prevent groups from holding and acting on rather different priorities. 5. The last point that Whitaker makes, namely that the legitimisation ofdiscrimination will cause politicians to lose their jobs has not been lost on the politicians. We believe that several of the thrusts of the recent White Paper on the NHS (5) are included specifically because politicians wish to shed themselves of this responsibility. The clinical budget holders, in managing their budgets, (or more specifically balancing their budgets) will not be able to afford to treat everyone but it will now be clearer that they are the architects of the rationing. Once you hold a clinical budget you are accepting the responsibility and blame for withholding worthwhile treatment. We foresee that the debate may be shifted from the socio-political setting to a sociomedical setting. We believe that clinicians have no more or less rights than the rest of society in establishing these priorities. We would have clinicians as the executors of this aspect of social policy, not its architects.
